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This paper re-examines the VAR evidence on the price puzzle and proposes a new 
theoretical interpretation. Using actual data and two identification strategies based 
on zero restrictions and model-consistent sign restrictions, we find that the 
positive response of prices to a monetary policy shock is historically limited to the 
sub-samples that are typically associated with a weak interest rate response to 
inflation. Using pseudo data generated by a sticky price model of the US 
economy, we then show that the structural VARs are capable of reproducing the 
price puzzle only when monetary policy is passive. The omission in the VARs of 
a variable capturing expected inflation is found to account for the price puzzle 
observed in simulated and actual data. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan vektoriautoregressiivisten (VAR) aikasarja-
mallien näyttöä rahapolitiikan epätavallisista hintavaikutuksista ja ehdotetaan sitä 
tulkittavaksi uudella tavalla. Työn tulosten mukaan rahapolitiikan yllättävä 
keventyminen on historiassa nostanut talouden hintatasoa tyypillisesti silloin, kun 
talouden nimellinen korkotaso reagoi vain heikosti inflaatiovauhdin muutoksiin, 
eli kun rahapolitiikka on ollut passiivista. Tähän estimointitulokseen päädytään, 
kun rahapolitiikan eksogeeninen sokki identifioidaan tilastoaineistosta kahdella 
vaihtoehtoisella tavalla eli käyttäen nollarajoitteita tai teoreettisesta mallista 
johdettuja rajoitteita. Työssä osoitetaan lisäksi, että tämä ns. hintapähkinä syntyy 
passiivisen rahapolitiikan aikana myös, kun rakenteellinen VAR-malli estimoi-
daan suhteellisen tavanomaisesta Yhdysvaltain taloutta kuvaavasta hitaasti sopeu-
tuvien hintojen makromallista simuloidulla aineistolla. Keskeiseksi syyksi hinta-
pähkinään osoittautuu VAR-mallin täsmennysvirhe, kun estimoitava malli ei 
sisällä odotetun inflaation vaikutuksia mittaavaa (viite)muuttujaa. 
 
Avainsanat: rakenteellinen VAR (SVAR), hintapähkinä, jäykkien hintojen malli, 
Taylorin periaate, passiivinen (raha)politiikka 
 
JEL-luokittelu: E30, E52  
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Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) are widely used for measuring and
understanding the eﬀects of monetary policy innovations on the aggregate
economy. While most results in the VAR literature are consistent with
economic intuition and macroeconomic theory, the typically found positive and
signiﬁcant reaction of the price level on impact to a monetary policy shock is a
fact that most monetary models have diﬃculty explaining. This anomaly, ﬁrst
noted by Sims (1992) and labelled ‘the price puzzle’ by Eichenbaum (1992),
casts serious doubts on the ability of correctly identifying a monetary policy
shock. If the central bank monitors and responds to a larger information set
than that of the VAR, what is referred to as a policy shock is actually a
combination of a genuine policy shock and some endogenous policy reactions.
Sims (1992) argues that the central bank may have more information about
future inﬂation than a simple VAR could adequately capture. The result of
this omission is that a policy tightening in anticipation of future inﬂation
would be incorrectly interpreted by the econometrician as a policy shock. As
long as monetary policy only partially oﬀsets inﬂationary pressures, the VAR
would deliver a spurious correlation between a tightening of policy and a rise
in inﬂation, namely the price puzzle. Sims (1992) observes that the inclusion
of a commodity price index in the VAR appears to capture enough additional
information about future inﬂation as to possibly solve the puzzle.
This paper oﬀers a theoretically consistent explanation for the price puzzle
using a small scale DSGE model and structural VARs. Earlier contributions
have shown, using zero restrictions, thatt h ep r i c ep u z z l eh a sb e e nad i s t i n c t i v e
feature of US data mainly before the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed
Chairman in 1979 (see Hanson, 2004). In this paper, we show that the price
puzzle emerges in the pre-1979 period also when the monetary policy shock is
identiﬁed using the sign restrictions implied by a standard sticky price model.
A number of contributions to the empirical literature on monetary policy
have shown that a shift in the conduct of US monetary policy occurred in
1979 (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000, Boivin
and Giannoni, 2006, Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004, Cogley and Sargent, 2005,
among others).1 We therefore investigate the correlation between the empirical
result of this literature about monetary policy and the empirical ﬁnding about
the price puzzle. Using a sticky price model of the US economy as data
generating process, we show that structural VARs on artiﬁcial data, based
on either zero restrictions or model-consistent sign restrictions,a r ec a p a b l e
of reproducing the price puzzle only when the central bank does not raise
the interest rate suﬃciently in response to inﬂation.2 The DSGE model,
in contrast, does not generate, on impact, a positive response of the price
1A similar ﬁnding is reported also by Sims and Zha (2006), who however dispute the
notion that a shift in monetary policy has been the main driver of the Great Moderation.
2The cost channel and the interaction of active ﬁscal policy and passive monetary policy
could also, in principle, contribute to the sub-sample evidence on the price puzzle. At the
empirical level, however, Rabanal (2007) estimates a DSGE sticky price model augmented
with a cost channel on US aggegate data and shows that the estimated model is not capable
of generating a price puzzle.
7level to a monetary policy shock, not even when monetary policy is passive.3
A contribution of the paper is to show that the price puzzle can actually
be a spurious correlation induced by the omission in the VAR of a variable
capturing the persistence of expected inﬂation, which is remarkably higher
under the passive regime. The omitted variable problem is found to account
quantitatively for the puzzling response of inﬂation to a policy shock observed
on actual data. Interestingly, our results show that the arguments in Sims
(1992) are supported in the context of a structural model only when monetary
policy is passive and thus multiple equilibria arise.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a re-examination
of the empirical evidence using estimated SVARs in output, inﬂation and the
nominal interest rate. The following part describes the sticky price model used
for the theoretical investigation. In Section 4, the dynamic responses of the
theoretical model to a monetary policy shock are compared to the impulse
responses of the structural VARs estimated on artiﬁcial data. The latter are
shown to be systematically above the former under indeterminacy only, and to
reproduce the sign and magnitude of the price puzzle observed in the pre-1979
period. Section 5 oﬀers a new interpretation of the price puzzle and shows
that augmenting the SVAR on actual data with the inﬂation forecasts from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters reduces signiﬁcantly the omitted variable
problem that would emerge otherwise.
2 A re-examination of the VAR evidence
This section reconsiders the empirical evidence from the VAR literature and
corroborates the notion that the price-puzzle is limited to a speciﬁch i s t o r i c a l
period. This period corresponds to the monetary regime that in the empirical
literature on policy rules is associated with a weak central bank reaction to
inﬂation.
Consistent with the empirical literature on monetary policy shifts, we divide
the postwar period around the third quarter of 1979, when Paul Volcker was
a p p o i n t e dC h a i r m a no ft h eF e da n dﬁghting inﬂation became a clear policy
objective. The two periods are therefore 1966Q1—1979Q3 and 1979Q4—2006Q4.
The beginning of the ﬁrst subsample corresponds to the date when the Federal
funds rate was ﬁrst traded consistently above the discount rate. The choice
of the break date is also supported by standard statistical tests. A Chow-test
run on the reduced form federal funds rate equation in a VAR(4) rejects the
null of stability with a p-value equal to 0.006.4
3Following the literature, monetary policy is deﬁned as ‘active’ (‘passive’) when the
nominal interest rate is moved more (less) than proportionally in response to movements in
inﬂation. The inability of the structural model to produce a positive response of price to a
policy shock is conditional to the estimates in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), which will be
used below to generate the artiﬁcial data. For an estimated sticky-price model capable of
generating a price puzzle under a passive policy regime, see Belaygorod and Dueker (2007).
4Our results are robust to beginning the ﬁrst sub-sample in the ﬁrst quarter of 1960 and
the second sub-sample begin in the fourth quarter of 1982, which corresponds to the end of
Volcker’s experiment on non-borrowed reserves targeting.
82.1 Zero restrictions
A possible way to identify the monetary policy shock is to adopt the recursive
scheme put forward by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and employ
a Cholesky factorization of the variance covariance matrix estimated from
the unrestricted VAR. With a lower-triangular structure, the ordering  =
[  ]
0 implies that the measure of real activity, , is the most exogenous
variable, the measure of inﬂation, , can respond contemporaneously to real
activity only, whereas the instrument of monetary policy, , can respond
contemporaneously to both inﬂation and real activity. The last equation in the
structural VAR is interpreted as a contemporaneous policy rule.
As for our variables, Giordani (2004) emphasizes that the inclusion of a
measure of output gap reduces the biases that could otherwise arise when
comparing predictions from a structural macro model and a VAR. Our measure
of real activity is the CBO output gap, constructed as percentage log-deviation
of real GDP with respect to the Congressional Budget Oﬃce potential output.
The measure of inﬂation is the annualized quarter-on-quarter GDP deﬂator
inﬂation rate, while the policy instrument is the federal funds rate (average of
monthly realizations). The data were collected from the website of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions estimated for the two
subsamples with VARs displaying a constant, no trend, and 2 (4) lags as for
the ﬁrst (second) subsample.5 The reaction of inﬂation to a unitary monetary
policy tightening suggests a signiﬁcant diﬀerence when moving from the ﬁrst to
the second subsample. The price puzzle is present during the pre-1979 regime
only. Following the monetary policy tightening, the inﬂation rate signiﬁcantly
increases in the short-run, and maintains a value statistically larger than zero
for a few quarters while reverting to its steady-state value. The responses of
interest rate and output have the expected signs. Turning to the post-Volcker
era in the bottom panel, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of a price puzzle in that
the inﬂation reaction to a policy shock is not positive. In fact, it is negative
on impact and then fades away fairly quickly. Importantly, such a response is
far from being statistically relevant.
The estimated responses of the output gap and inﬂation are hardly
signiﬁcant in the second subsample, consistent with evidence obtained, among
others, by Boivin and Giannoni (2006). The literature has put forward
a couple of interpretations for this. The ﬁrst interpretation regards the
reduced inﬂuence exerted by monetary policy shocks on the economy, reduction
possibly due to technological and ﬁnancial innovations that might have enabled
ﬁrms and consumers to better tackle the impact of interest rate ﬂuctuations.
An alternative explanation refers to the improvement of systematic monetary
policy. Given a monetary policy shock, inﬂation and output deviations with
respect to their targets might have been more eﬀectively contrasted by a tighter
systematic reaction in the post-Volcker experiment era. If this is the case, the
5The number of lags in the VARs is chosen throughout the paper according to the Schwarz
information criterion. The results are robust to keeping the number of lags ﬁxed across
sub-samples. One standard error bands are computed via Montecarlo simulations to control
for small-sample biases.
9modest reactions of output and inﬂation to a monetary policy shock would be
a direct consequence of better monetary policy management (see Boivin and
Giannoni, 2006, for empirical evidence supporting this interpretation).
I ns u m m a r y ,F i g u r e1s h o w st h a tt h ep r i c ep u z z l ei ss t a t i s t i c a l l yr e l e v a n t
in the pre-1979 subsample only. Barth and Ramey (2001) and Hanson (2004)
point out that these results may be obtained also with VARs estimated with
monthly data. Our evidence lines up also with the results in Boivin and
Giannoni (2002 and 2006), and Barakchian and Crowe (2009). Furthermore,
the ﬁnding of a price puzzle in the 1970s appears independent from using
real GDP or the output gap as a measure of real activity (see Castelnuovo and
Surico, 2006, for a battery of alternative speciﬁcations conﬁrming this ﬁnding).
While being possibly sensitive to the VAR speciﬁcation, we can safely state that
the price puzzle evidence, if present, is much weaker in the second subsample.
2.2 A model-consistent identiﬁcation strategy: sign restrictions
The recursive identiﬁcation assumption is widely employed in the empirical
macro literature, and the price puzzle obtained by Sims (1992) stems from a
VAR in which the monetary policy shock is identiﬁed via a Cholesky scheme.
However, the new-Keynesian model does not imply a recursive relationships
among output, inﬂation, and the policy rate. In this section, then, we discuss
the robustness of our results to using an alternative identiﬁcation scheme based
on the sign restrictions implied by the New-Keynesian model presented in
section 3.6
We impose the restrictions that a monetary policy shock has a non-negative
impact on the interest rate and a non-positive eﬀect on the output gap. It is
worth emphasizing that unlike previous contributions, which rule out the price
puzzle by assuming a non-positive inﬂation response to a monetary policy
shock, we deliberately leave the inﬂation response unconstrained in an eﬀort
to investigate and document the sub-sample regularity associated with the
price puzzle.
As for the eﬀects of shocks to the Phillips curve and the IS curve, they are
consistent with a typical aggregate demand and aggregate supply diagram: a
disturbance to the Phillips (IS) curve has a non-negative (non negative) eﬀect
on the interest rate and inﬂation, and a non-positive (non-negative) eﬀect on
the output gap. The reason for our choice of identifying other disturbances
in addition to the monetary policy shock, while not crucial for the results,
is twofold. First, we want to make sure that the matrix of contemporaneous
parameters, which also identiﬁes the policy shock, does not produce responses
of inﬂation, output and interest rate to other shocks that are inconsistent with
economic intuition and theory. Second, we wish to impose most of the sign
restrictions implied by a typical DSGE sticky price model because this is the
vehicle used in Section 4 to show that the price puzzle is the artifact caused
by an omitted variable problem.
6For a description on the technical implementation of this alternative strategy, see
Peersman (2005), Uhlig (2005), Rubio-Ramirez et al (2006), and the references therein.
10In Figure 2, we present the impulse responses of the output gap, inﬂation
and the interest rate to a monetary policy shock. The price puzzle conﬁrms
itself as an empirical regularity associated to the pre-1979 sub-sample.
Relaxing the contemporaneous zero restrictions, in fact, ampliﬁe st h ep u z z l ei n
that the inﬂation response now becomes positive also on impact. By contrast,
following a policy shock inﬂation declines on impact over the post-1979
sub-sample and becomes also signiﬁcantly less persistent.7
3 A framework for monetary policy analysis
This section investigates whether the apparent price puzzle may come from the
(mis)identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock during the regimes associated
with a weak response of interest rate to inﬂation. The vehicle for our analysis
is a simple sticky price model of the kind popularized by Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1999), King (2000) and Woodford (2003) among others. This model
consists of the following equations
 = +1 − ( − +1)+ (3.1)
 = +1 + ( − ) (3.2)
 = −1 +( 1− )[+ +  ( − )] +  (3.3)
 ≡ [  ]










and oﬀ-diag =0 
(3.4)
where  is deﬁned as the deviation of output from its trend-path,  represents
inﬂation, and  is the nominal interest rate. Inﬂation and the interest rate
are expressed in percentage deviations from their steady state values.
Equation (3.1) is a log-linearized IS curve derived from the household’s
intertemporal problem in which consumption and bond holdings are the control
variables and  represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which
in this model is the inverse of the relative risk aversion, ie  ≡ −1.T h e r ei sn o
physical capital in this economy and therefore consumption is proportional to
total resources up to an exogenous process . The latter is typically interpreted
as a government spending shock or a preferences shock.8
Equation (3.2) captures the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world in
which each ﬁrm adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given
7The link between a monetary policy regime and the evidence on the price puzzle is not
limited to the US economy. While an international investigation is beyond the scope of
this paper, Castelnuovo and Surico (2006) and Benati (2008) employ tri-variate structural
VARs on UK data before and after the introduction of the inﬂation targeting regime in the
fourth quarter of 1992, and ﬁnd a sizable price puzzle only during the earlier sub-sample.
See Nelson (2003) for evidence on the UK monetary policy rules before and after 1992.
8The IS curve can be easily reinterpreted as a schedule explaining the behavior of the
‘output gap’ deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the stochastic components of output and the
ﬂexible price level of output (see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999). In this case, the shock
 is also a function of potential output variations.
11period, and independently from the time elapsed from the last adjustment.
The discrete nature of price setting creates an incentive to adjust prices more
the higher is the future inﬂation expected at time . The parameter 0 1
is the agents’ discount factor while  relates detrended output, ,a n dt h e
stochastic marginal cost of production, ,t ot h er a t e.
Equation (3.3) characterizes the behavior of the monetary authorities. This
is an interest rate rule according to which the central bank adjusts the policy
rate in response to inﬂation and the output gap. The reaction to inﬂation
may refer to contemporaneous realizations — identiﬁed by  =0— or expected
future realizations — captured by  =1 . These adjustments are implemented
smoothly, with  measuring the degree of interest rate smoothing. The
random variable  stands for the monetary policy shock, which can be
interpreted either as unexpected deviations from the policy rule or as policy
mistakes.
There is no correlation between innovations and their variance-covariance
matrix is described in equation (3.4). Furthermore, all shocks hitting the
economy are white noise. The last assumption has been deliberately designed
to make transparent the eﬀect of indeterminacy on the persistence of inﬂation
and inﬂation expectations. Allowing for an autoregressive process for  does
not alter our conclusions.9
4 Impulse response functions analysis
In this section, we investigate whether the small-scale monetary model detailed
above is capable of reproducing the price puzzle. The model is parameterized
using the estimates presented in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). We employ the
same identiﬁcation used for the structural VARs on two data sets generated
under indeterminacy and determinacy. The procedure in the simulations is as
follows:
1. Solve the model under both indeterminacy and determinacy, and
generate two data sets of 55 and 109 observations including output gap,
inﬂation and interest rate.10
2. For each solution, estimate a reduced-form tri-variate VAR on the
artiﬁcial data and impose the same identiﬁcation scheme adopted in the
empirical analysis in Section 2.
3. Compute the variable responses to a structural innovations in the interest
rate equation.
4. Repeat steps (i) to (iii) 10000 times and for each parameterization select
the median structural IRFs.
9Notice that the interest rate smoothing induces persistence of the endogenous variables
in the reduced-form representation of the system.
10The number of observations has been chosen to match the quarterly data points available
from 1966Q1 to 1979Q3 and from 1979Q4 to 2006Q4, respectively. In each simulated sample,
100 extra-observations are produced to generate a stochastic vector of initial conditions, and
then are discarded.
12To the extent that equilibrium indeterminacy can explain the price puzzle, the
SVARs using data generated under this condition should reproduce, at least
qualitatively, the stylized fact, and possibly generate structural IRFs that are
within the empirical conﬁdence bands shown in Section 2. On the other hand,
the SVARs using the data simulated under determinacy should not produce
any puzzling response.
4.1 Parameterization
In order to implement Step 1, we need to calibrate the structure of the economy
and the monetary policy rules to the history of the US economy. As for
aggregate demand and supply, we use the estimates of the New-Keynesian
model (3.1)—(3.4) by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), which are reported in
Panel A of Table 1. The only diﬀerence relative to their model is that our
speciﬁcation intentionally lacks any endogenous or exogenous persistence in
the inﬂation and output process. This choice reﬂects the attempt to evaluate
the ability of a quite forward-looking model to generate persistence under
indeterminacy. The ﬁrst (second) artiﬁcial data set corresponds to the reaction
function parameters under the heading Indeterminacy (Determinacy) in Panel
B of Table 1. In doing so, any diﬀerence in the structural IRFs estimated on
the artiﬁcial data sets can only be due to the variation in the Taylor rule (see
Benati and Surico, 2009, for a similar exercise on the Great Moderation). It is
worth noting that the interest rate response to inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst row does
not guarantee a unique RE equilibrium because  =0 89 violates the Taylor
principle.11 Hence, the parameters of the policy rule in this row generate
indeterminacy while the parameters in the second row do not. To focus on the
importance of a change in monetary policy, we keep all structural parameters
of the model ﬁxed across simulations with the exception of the coeﬃcients in
the interest rate equation.
4.2 Evidence on changes in US monetary policy: a brief review
A vast empirical literature has documented that an important change in the
conduct of US monetary policy occurred at the end of the 1970s in that
the nominal interest rate response to inﬂation became more than one-to-one.
The policy reaction to output is typically found only marginally larger in the
post-Volcker sample while the estimated degree of interest rate smoothing is
higher in the most recent period.
These results are found by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) when taking the
model presented above to US data. In particular, they provide strong evidence
11We postpone the presentation of the Taylor principle to Section 5. Under the passive
policy regime, we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2003 and 2004) and we solve the model
under the assumption that the impulse-response functions do not change discountinously at
the boundary between active and passive regimes. This solution is labeled ‘countinuity’. We
obtain very similar results under the assumption of ’orthogonality’ according to which the
eﬀects of the structural shocks are orthogonal to the eﬀects of the sunspot shocks.
13in favor of i) indeterminacy in the pre-Volcker sample and ii) a signiﬁcant shift
towards a more anti-inﬂationary policy stance inducing equilibrium uniqueness
when entering the 1980s. Given that we employ their model in our analysis,
it is somewhat natural for us to borrow the parameter values from Lubik and
Schorfheide’s contribution.
It is worth stressing, however, that variations of the postulated policy
rule appear to lead to the same qualitative results. While Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) assume a current-looking policy rule to perform their
full system estimations, Clarida et al (2000) and Judd and Rudebusch
(1988) concentrate on single-equation regressions for a large battery of
forward-looking, backward-looking and current-looking policy rules.
As for the transmission mechanism, we note that variations of the standard
sticky price model do not seem to overturn the evidence of a shift in US
monetary policy. Boivin and Giannoni (2006), for instance, employ a VAR
similar to the one used in this paper and a DSGE model similar to the one used
by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004): their minimum distance estimates support
the improved monetary policy explanation of the great moderation. A similar
conclusion is reached by Canova (2009).12
On the basis of the available evidence, we model a shift from passive to
active monetary policy. We assume a contemporaneous policy rule, ie we will
set  =0in equation (3.3), and we will assess the robustness of our ﬁndings
to employing a forward-looking policy rule, ie  =1 .
4.3 Impulse response functions: DSGE vs SVARs
This section compares two diﬀerent sets of IRFs following a monetary policy
shock. The ﬁrst set represents the DSGE model-consistent reactions, which
are the impulse responses computed by solving the system (3.1) to (3.4). The
second group of impulse responses are generated using Steps 1 to 4 of the
algorithm above, and therefore correspond to the estimates of the structural
SVARs on the artiﬁcial series of output gap, inﬂation and the nominal interest
rate generated by the model under indeterminacy and under determinacy,
following a unitary shock.
The results under indeterminacy are shown in the ﬁrst row of Figure 3.
Solid lines represent the model-consistent IRFs while dotted lines stand for the
IRFs of the SVAR on artiﬁcial data. Several interesting results arise. First, the
model consistent inﬂation reaction to the policy shock is negative on impact.
After a few quarters, this reaction becomes mildly positive before converging
smoothly to the initial level. Not surprisingly, we obtain an inﬂation response
which is very similar to the response estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004).
The DSGE model is not able of producing a price puzzle, though it is able
to account under indeterminacy for the inertia of inﬂation following a monetary
12It should be noted that other studies such as Smets and Wouters (2007) do not ﬁnd
evidence in favor of a shift in monetary policy. The authors, however, constrain their
estimates to be in the determinacy region.
14policy shock. This suggests that the results in Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), who
ﬁnd that purely forward-looking models are not capable of reproducing the
persistent and hump-shaped responses to a monetary policy shock observed in
empirical VARs, may be attributed, at least for inﬂation, to limiting implicitly
the solution of the model to the determinacy region.
The inﬂation reaction from the recursive VAR on artiﬁcial data begins at
zero by construction, depicts a fairly steep curve that reaches its peak at about
50 basis points after a couple of quarters, then starts converging towards the
steady state. Indeed, this dynamic response represents evidence for the price
puzzle being an artifact that stems from the failure of the estimated SVAR to
correctly identify the eﬀects of the monetary policy shock under indeterminacy.
Notably, this pattern is within (or close to) the empirical error bands of the
inﬂation response identiﬁed using the recursive strategy on actual data.13
The reaction of the federal funds rate to a policy shock is reported in
the third column. The estimated interest rate response from the SVAR on
simulated data is shifted outward relative to the response implied by the DSGE
model. This is likely to reﬂect the fact that, because of the diﬀerence of the
inﬂation IRFs, the systematic component of monetary policy responds to a
higher level of inﬂation in the recursive VAR on simulated data. In contrast,
the response of the output gap is fairly in line with the structural model with
the sole exception, by construction, of the zero contemporaneous restriction
imposed in the SVAR. Indeterminacy in this model thus mostly inﬂuences
the persistence of inﬂation and the interest rate, whereas it does not seem to
inﬂuence much the persistence of the output gap response.
The solution of the model under determinacy returns two sets of IRFs
that are virtually indistinguishable. The New Keynesian model suggests an
on-impact inﬂation drop following a policy rate shock. After a few periods
below zero, however, inﬂation returns to its steady state value reﬂecting the
lack of endogenous inﬂation persistence in the model. The response of output
gap and inﬂation in the estimated VAR are diﬀerent, by construction, in the
contemporaneous period only while the response of the policy rate very closely
tracks the model-consistent IRF at all periods.14
Forward-looking Taylor rule
The ‘in-laboratory’ exercises conducted so far have relied upon the
current-looking Taylor rule estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
However, Clarida et al (2000) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) stress the
relevance of the break in the systematic reaction to expected inﬂation. One
may then wonder how robust the results presented in Figure 3 may be to
13Importantly, the price puzzle arising under indeterminacy is not due to a small-sample
bias, but instead to the misspeciﬁcation of the vector. In fact, we repeated the exercise
with very large samples (10,000 observations), and still found clear (and incorrect) evidence
pointing towards the price puzzle under indeterminacy. This result, not shown for the sake
of brevity, is available upon request.
14We veriﬁed that this result does not hold true under ‘near indeterminacy’, ie when
monetary policy is active but very close to become passive. By contrast, the main
message from these IRFs is unchanged using the alternative parameterization in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004). Moreover, we show in Castelnuovo and Surico (2006) that the results
presented here are not overturned by introducing habit formation into the model.
15u s i n gaf o r w a r d - l o o k i n gr u l e . T ot a c k l et h i si s s u e ,w er e p e a to u re x e r c i s eb y
assuming  =1in equation (3.3). As for the calibration of the parameter ,
we maintain 089, a value statistically in line with the one obtained by Clarida
et al (2000, Table II, page 157).
Figure 4 depicts the responses conditional to the forward-looking Taylor
rule. One may easily notice that, from a qualitative standpoint, there are
little changes relative to what already discussed: under indeterminacy the
estimated SVAR performs poorly and signals a price puzzle when, in fact, the
unexpected interest rate hike induces ﬁrms able to re-optimize to set lower
prices. Interestingly, a forward-looking Taylor rule appears to trigger a more
severe recession and a more marked deﬂation. Under determinacy, the SVAR
estimates track the dynamic reactions in the data generating process (solid
line) remarkably well.
Mapping between data and theory: Sign restrictions
The exercise on pseudo-data is based on zero restrictions. While very popular
in the empirical literature, this recursive identiﬁcation scheme is inconsistent
with the structure of the sticky price model of section 3, and therefore it may
make it more diﬃcult to isolate the source of the ‘simulated price puzzle’.
To tackle this issue, we re-estimate tri-variate SVARs with pseudo-data by
employing an identiﬁcation scheme consistent with the timing of our DSGE
model. In particular, we impose the following sign-restrictions: a supply
(demand) disturbance have a non-negative (non negative) eﬀect on the interest
rate and inﬂation, and a non-positive (non-negative) eﬀect on the output gap.
The ﬁrst and second row of Figure 5 display the outcome of this exercise. In
line with the results from the recursive identiﬁcation, the price puzzle emerges
in Panel A only when monetary policy is passive.15 Consequently, this evidence
corroborates the view that the systematically larger response of the structural
VARs relative to the model is not due to the mismatch between the timing of
the DSGE model and the one imposed by the previously employed Cholesky
identiﬁcation scheme. Under determinacy, which corresponds to a case where
the VAR is correctly speciﬁed and thus the policy shock is correctly identiﬁed,
the IRFs of the VAR based on sign restrictions track quite closely those of the
DSGE model and the price puzzle does not materialize. When excluding the
timing issue as a possible source of the simulated price puzzle, we are left with
indeterminacy as the candidate for explaining the wedge between the DSGE
model-based and the SVAR-based inﬂation reactions to a monetary policy
shock under indeterminacy. Given the popularity of the recursive identiﬁcation
scheme in the literature, as well as the fact that the ‘price puzzle’ has been
mainly obtained by assuming a recursive economy, in the remainder of the
paper we will mainly deal with SVARs estimated with a Cholesky scheme.
It is of interest to compare the impulse response functions obtained
under determinacy with the two alternative identiﬁcation schemes discussed
15Interestingly, the misspeciﬁed VAR is uncapable to distinguish between a monetary
policy shock and a supply shock. This result provides formal support to Bernanke (2004),
who stated: ‘[...] changes in inﬂation expectations, which are ultimately the product of the
monetary policy regime, can also be confused with truly exogenous shocks in conventional
econometric analysis.’
16previously. Figures 3 and 4 reveal that imposing a zero restriction on the
contemporaneous reactions of output and inﬂation to a monetary policy
shock introduces a hump-shaped pattern which is not present in the impulse
responses of the DSGE model. In contrast, the identiﬁcation based on sign
restrictions in Figure 5 is capable of reproducing the shape of the reactions in
the data generating process. This seems to suggest that the contemporaneous
zero restrictions might be responsible for the empirical ﬁnding in the recursive
VAR literature of hump-shaped responses of output and inﬂation to a policy
shock.
5 Interpreting the price puzzle
This section explores the source of the systematic diﬀerences between the IRFs
of the sticky price model and the IRFs of the SVARs, and assesses the extent
to which misspeciﬁcation can account for the price puzzle observed during the
passive monetary policy regime.
5.1 The role of the omitted variable in the SVAR
In the simpler case where the central bank does not smooth the nominal
interest rate ( =0 ), the three equation New-Keynesian model can be solved
analytically. Woodford (2003) shows that the solution of the system (3.1)—(3.4)
is aﬀected by the degree of systematic policy activism implemented by the
monetary policy authorities. In particular, such solution is unique if and only
if the following condition — ie the ‘Taylor principle’ — is met




If the constraint (5.1) is satisﬁed, the dynamics of the economy only depend on
fundamentals and it is possible to re-write output, inﬂation and interest rate
equations as a function of the structural shocks only. Under indeterminacy,
in contrast, the transmission of structural shocks is altered and the system is
augmented with a latent variable which is not present i nt h eu n i q u er a t i o n a l
expectations equilibrium. Moreover, sunspot shocks may aﬀect expectations
and, ultimately, the equilibrium of the economic system. In particular,
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) show that when monetary policy is passive the


























where 1−1 is a latent variable that follows the AR(1) process 1 =
11−1 + ,a n d ∼ (0 2
) is a sunspot shock hitting the variables of
17interest. The sunspot shock may then hit inﬂation expectations, consequently
inﬂuencing current inﬂation whose equilibrium path is described by eq. (5.2).
The coeﬃcient 1 is the stable eigenvalue of the system (3.1)—(3.4), the
innovation  is a combination of structural and sunspot shocks while Φ
and Υ are matrices of convolutions of the parameters of the model.
The system (5.2) discloses three important insights. First, a tri-variate
VAR in the output gap, inﬂation and nominal interest rate is misspeciﬁed when
the data are generated according to a New-Keynesian model and the monetary
policy rule violates the Taylor Principle. Second, the mis-speciﬁcation is
induced by monetary policy and comes in the form of an omitted variable.
Third, the passive monetary policy rule generates ‘extra’ dynamics with respect
to the regime associated with an active policy rule.16 While it is not possible
to derive an analytical mapping between the series of 1−1 and each variable
in the system, it is worth exploring the extent to which, under indeterminacy,
the omitted variable issue may be relevant for amending the price puzzle.
T h er o l eo fo m i t t e dv a r i a b l e s
When looking at the model (3.1)—(3.4), we may think of two diﬀerent
endogenous variables that are not explicitly and fully accounted for by our
tri-variate VAR, namely inﬂation expectations and output gap expectations.
Indeed, expected inﬂation and the expected output gap embed information
about the monetary policy regime beyond the interest rate, inﬂation and the
output gap. In theory, the inclusion of any of these two variables, or of a
linear combination of the two, could ameliorate the misspeciﬁcation problem.
To assess the extent to which this is the case in practice, we run a battery
of four-variate VARs in which a linear combination of expected inﬂation and
expected output gap enters as additional regressor. Our search reveals that
the combination that ameliorate the price puzzle most is the one in which
expected inﬂation has weight one and expected output gap has weight zero.17
Figure 6 plots the response of the output gap, inﬂation and interest rate
from the augmented four-variate recursive VARs where expected inﬂation is
ordered ﬁrst in the vector of series ˜  =[ +1  ]
0 generated from the
baseline New-Keynesian model. The IRFs are shown for the indeterminacy
solution as the omitted variable problem is present in this case only. For
the sake of comparison, the corresponding impulse response functions from
the tri-variate VAR in Figure 3 are reproduced as dotted lines. The IRFs
using the four-variate VAR augmented with expected inﬂation are displayed
as pentagrams.
First and foremost, one may notice the substantial improvement in
the estimated inﬂation reaction stemming from the four-variate, inﬂation
expectations augmented SVAR. After departing from zero (by construction),
the pentagrams suggest a negative realization of inﬂation, in line with the
new-Keynesian model and in stark contrast to the indication coming from
16As pointed out by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004, page 201), under indeterminacy the
number of stable eigenvalues is generally larger than under determinacy, ie fewer ‘states’
−1 in eq. (5.2) are suppressed. Consequently, a richer autocovariance pattern may be
expected.
17These results, not presented for the sake of brevity, are available upon request.
18the tri-variate SVAR. Moreover, the diﬀerence with respect to the IRFs of
the New-Keynesian model (solid lines) appears to be remarkably dampened.18
Furthermore, a comparison with the dotted lines from the tri-variate VAR
reveals that controlling for expected inﬂation accounts on its own for a large
portion of the omitted variable problem that is behind the price puzzle detected
by the structural VARs. An appreciable improvement in terms of short-run
reactions of output and the policy rate is also present. As for the tri-variate
VAR without inﬂation expectations, we notice a large reaction of inﬂation to
a monetary policy shock, which clearly overestimates that suggested by the
new-Keynesian model.19
This ﬁnding qualiﬁes and extends Sims’ conjecture about the
mis-identiﬁcation of the policy shock in a mis-speciﬁed VAR. In particular,
expected inﬂation matters not only for the ability of VARs to predict future
inﬂation but also, more importantly, for their ability to mimic the latent
variable that arises only under indeterminacy. Our results therefore also
provide a rationale for the ﬁnding in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005)
that the inclusion of a latent factor (ordered ﬁrst) in an otherwise standard
three-variate recursive VAR can sensibly reduce the price puzzle over the full
postwar sample.
5.2 Assessing the role of inﬂation expectations
The previous results pose an important empirical question: ‘What
macroeconomic series can approximate in practice the omitted variable induced
by a passive monetary policy?’. The New-Keynesian model used in this paper
suggests that the omitted variable is indeed a product of the passive monetary
policy regime. Equation (5.2) reveals that whenever this additional variable is
omitted from the VAR, the identiﬁcation of the structural shocks is invalid in
that, for instance, the innovations to the interest rate equation are not anymore
truly exogenous; rather they are a convolution of the monetary policy shock
and a speciﬁcation error.
And, by neglecting this misspeciﬁcation, the incorrectly identiﬁed policy
shock has the ﬂavor of an adverse supply shock in that, as shown in the ﬁrst row
of Figures 3 to 5, it moves inﬂation and output in opposite directions. Under
determinacy, in contrast, the monetary policy shock is correctly identiﬁed and,
in line with the theory, it causes inﬂation and output to move in the same
direction. Furthermore, the inclusion of expected inﬂa t i o ni nt h eS V A Ro f
Figure 6 appears to account for most of the diﬀerence of the responses of
inﬂation and interest rate relative to the model.
The ﬁndings of the previous section suggest that expected inﬂation may
provide a reasonable approximation for the omitted variable that emerges
18By construction, the VAR inﬂation response does not fall on impact due to the
zero-restriction impliedb yt h eC h o l e s k yi d e n t i ﬁcation scheme.
19Note that our SVARs suggest positive realizations of inﬂation in subsequent quarters, a
behaviour qualitatively in line with that of the new-Keynesian model and ultimately driven
by the matrices Φ and Υ (see eq. (5.2)). Interestingly, inﬂation expectations appear to
ameliorate the estimated inﬂation dynamics response also at later periods.
19under the passive monetary regime. To bring this prediction to the data and
augment the otherwise misspeciﬁed VAR, one needs to select a measure of
inﬂation expectations that captures the view and sentiment of the private
sector on inﬂation. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia makes available
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), a collection of inﬂation and GDP
forecasts based on the expectations of market participants.
To investigate the role of expected inﬂation, we then run two four-variate
structural VARs on actual data using the two identiﬁcation strategies based on
the contemporaneous zero restrictions and the sign restrictions employed in the
empirical section. For the recursive (lower-triangular) identiﬁcation, the vector
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
+1 represents the (mean value) of the one-quarter ahead GDP inﬂation
forecasts from the SPF. We focus on this time series because one-quarter ahead
is the relevant horizon to forecast inﬂation in the New-Keynesian model used
in this paper.
Figure 7 plots the results over the sub-sample 1968Q4—1979Q3. The left
panel refers to the estimates based on zero restrictions while the right panel
corresponds to the sign restrictions identiﬁcation strategy. The solid lines with
squares represent the estimated inﬂation response from the SVARs augmented
with the SPF expected inﬂation while the dash-dotted lines represent error
bands.
Two results stand out. First, the identiﬁcation based on sign restrictions
implied by the new-Keynesian model delivers now a signiﬁcantly negative
response of inﬂation on impact. This contrasts with the signiﬁcantly positive
response estimated with the tri-variate SVAR (see Figure 3), and thus suggests
that expected inﬂation is indeed empirically important during the pre-Volcker
regime. Second, the ﬁnding that the inﬂation response is statistically
non-positive on impact is robust to the alternative identiﬁcation based on
zero-restrictions.
The impulse responses in ﬁgures 6 and 7 display some diﬀerences. It is
worth noting, however, that we focus here on the (puzzling positive) reaction
of inﬂation to a monetary policy tightening on impact. Furthermore, we have
ﬁxed the values of the parameters of the model rather than calibrating them
so as to match the impulse responses.20
Adding expected inﬂation to the SVAR estimated over the sub-sample
1979Q4—2006Q4 produces IRFs, not reported but available upon request,
which are virtually identical to the IRFs from the estimated tri-variate SVAR
in the output gap, inﬂation and federal funds rate only. We thus conclude that
only when monetary policy is passive, inﬂation expectations contain marginal
explanatory power for inﬂation and become helpful to identify a monetary
policy shock. In Castelnuovo and Surico (2006), we show that the results in
this section are robust to using the Greenbook inﬂation forecasts, which are
prepared by the Fed staﬀ before each meeting of the Federal Open Market
Committee (see also Carboni and Ellison, 2009).
20Canova and Sala (2009) show that the indirect inference based on matching impulse
responses may lead to serious identiﬁcation problems in a small scale DSGE model similar
to the one used in this paper.
206C o n c l u s i o n s
The contribution of this paper is twofold. At the empirical level, it corroborates
the notion that the price puzzle is a sub-sample regularity related to the period
that, in the empirical literature on monetary policy rules, is typically associated
with a weak central bank response to inﬂation. These are the years prior
to the appointment of Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve Chairman in August
1979. The VAR evidence presented here is robust to two diﬀerent identiﬁcation
strategies based on zero restrictions and the sign restrictions implied by the
New-Keynesian model.
At the theoretical level, this paper employs a sticky price model of the
US economy to investigate whether indeterminacy, as induced by a passive
monetary policy, can account quantitatively for the price puzzle observed
during the pre-1979 period.
The sticky price model produces, on impact, a positive inﬂation response to
a monetary policy shock, neither under determinacy nor under indeterminacy.
On the basis of Montecarlo simulations, we argue that the price puzzle can be
t h ea r t i f a c to fas p e c i ﬁcation error in the VARs. The mis-speciﬁcation comes
from the omission of a latent variable, which exists only when the monetary
policy rule is passive. Expected inﬂa t i o na r ef o u n dt oa p p r o x i m a t et h i so m i t t e d
variable reasonably well, both in the theory and in the data. Our ﬁnding
suggests that inﬂation expectations are key to identify correctly a monetary
policy shock during a passive regime.
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Table 1    Model parameters 
 
Panel A: Structure of the economy 
 
β  κ  τ
-1  σg  σz 
0.99  0.75 2.08 0.21 1.16 
 
 
Panel B: Monetary policy rules and sunspot shock 
 
Sub-sample  ψπ  ψx  ρR  σR  σζ 
Indeterminacy  0.89 0.15 0.53 0.24 0.23 
Determinacy  2.19 0.30 0.84 0.24  – 
 
Note: The parameterization of the data generating process is borrowed from Lubik and 




Figure 1.  IRFs to a monetary policy shock 































































Note: Tri-variate VAR in CBO output gap, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. 
Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-
covariance matrix. Solid lines are point estimates, dotted lines are 16th and 84th percentile error 
bands computed via a Monte Carlo procedure (500 repetitions). Quarters on the x-axis, percentage 




Figure 2.  IRFs to a monetary policy shock 































































Note: Tri-variate VAR in CBO output gap, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. 
Identification based on the sign restrictions. Solid lines are median estimates; dotted lines are 16th 




Figure 3.  Impulse response functions to a monetary policy 
      shock: structural model vs structural VAR on 
     simulated  data 
 
Panel A: Indeterminacy 






















Panel B: Determinacy 






















Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural VAR on 
simulated data. The data generating process is the New-Keynesian model in the main text 
parameterized according to Table 1. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data 
are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, 
and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through 
a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix using the following 
ordering: output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Quarters on the x-axis, percentage points 
on the y-axis.  
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Figure 4.  Impulse response functions to a monetary policy 
      shock: structural model with forward looking 
      rule vs structural VAR on simulated data 
 
Panel A: Indeterminacy 
























Panel B: Determinacy 
























Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural VAR on 
simulated data. The data generating process is the New-Keynesian model in the main text 
parameterized according to Table 1 with one-step ahead inflation expectations in the Taylor rule. 
The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In 
each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of 
stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) 
factorization of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: output gap, inflation 
and nominal interest rate. Quarters on the x-axis, percentage points on the y-axis.  
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Figure 5.  Impulse response functions to a monetary policy 
      shock: structural model vs structural VAR on 
     simulated  data 
 
      Identification based on sign restrictions 
 



































Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural VAR on 
simulated data. The data generating process is the New-Keynesian model in the main text 
parameterized according to Table 1. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data 
are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, 
and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. Identification based on the sign 
restrictions as indicated in the text. Quarters on the x-axis, percentage points on the y-axis.  
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Figure 6.  Impulse response functions to a monetary policy 
      shock: the role of the omitted variable under 
     indeterminacy 
 






















SVAR without expected variables




Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on 
simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra 
observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. 
Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-
covariance matrix using the following ordering: expected future inflation, output gap, inflation and 
nominal interest rate. Quarters on the x-axis, percentage points on the y-axis. 
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Figure 7.  Inflation responses to a monetary policy shock 
      from four-variate estimated SVARs with expected 
     inflation:  pre-Volcker  period 
 
Contemporaneous zero restrictions Sign  restrictions 
 



























Note: One-quarter ahead Survey of Professional Forecasters expected inflation (mean value), CBO 
output gap, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate (bottom panels). Solid lines are median 
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